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PROBLEMS IN JOINT OWNERSHIP OF PATENTS
HARRINGTON A. LACKEY*
NATURE OF PATENT RIGHTS

In that area of the law where rights in the products of mental conception are created, transferred and litigated, the general practitioner
is often bewildered by the challenge to identify such rights with legal
principles familiar to him. Although certain of these rights have arisen
and are protected under our common law, patent rights are creatures
of federal statutes authorized under our Constitution.' Moreover,
patents are identified as property, and under the 1952 Patent Act, they
have been further classified as personal property. 2 Here the confusion
begins.
While the statute treats a patent as personal property, the very next
paragraph in the same section of the Code states that patents shall be
assigned by an instrument in writing and further permits the conveyance of patent interests carved into geographical areas.3 Again,
the last paragraph of the same section of title 354 provides for the
recording of an assignment, grant or conveyance of a patent and
establishes the rights of a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration without notice in a manner quite similar to the treatment of deeds
of real estate by recording statutes.
The confusion which may arise in the attempt to treat patent property according to the recognized laws of real property or personal
property is well illustrated in an opinion by Chief Justice Nott of the
United States Court of Claims:
* Member, Tennessee Bar; admitted to practice before the United States
Patent Office.
1. "The Congress shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex-

clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
2. "Subject to the provisions of this title, patents shall have the attributes
of personal property." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952). "The first paragraph is new
but is declaratory only." H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952). But

see Fried Krupp Aktien-Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 Fed. 588 (3d
Cir. 1911), where a patent is considered to be a contract between the inventor

and the government.
3. "Applications for patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The applicant, patentee, or his
assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an
exclusive right under this application for patent, or patents, to the whole

or any specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1952).
4. "An assignment, grant or conveyance shall be void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, without notice,
unless it is recorded in the Patent Office within three months from its date
or prior to the date of such subsequent purchase or mortgage." 35 U.S.C.
§ 261 (1952).
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This new form of property, the mind-work of the inventor, though its
constitutional existence is now well nigh a century old, is still a novelty
in the law. The wisdom of the common law gives neither maxims nor
precedents to guide, and the American cases which deal with it, though
numerous enough, run in a narrow, statutory groove. Though the most
intangible form of property, it still, in many characteristics, is closer
in analogy to real than to personal estate. Unlike personal property,
it can not be lost or found; it is not liable to casualty or destruction;
it cannot pass by manual delivery. Like real property, it may be disposed
of, territorially, by metes or bounds; it has its system of conveyancing
by deed and registration; estates may be created in it, such as for years
and in remainder; and the statutory action for infringement bears a much
closer relation to an action of trespass than to action in trover and
replevin. It has, too, what the law of real property has, a system of user
by license. 5
In his latest edition on Patent Assignments, Ridsdale Ellis makes
the observation that the courts have attempted to follow cases involving the conveyancing of both personal and real property in deciding questions of patent properties. However, "the general nature
of patent rights is so different from other kinds of property that the
doctrine of 'stare decisis' is rarely applied. '6 In looking to the decisions
relating to real and ordinary personal property, the courts have used
the decisions as suggestions only for the solution to a patent problem.
Except for the fact that patents are created differently from other
types of property,7 and the patent laws are frequently inconsistent
with the laws of personal property or real property or both, it is
nevertheless clear that patents are a form of property, and as such
are subject to ownership, transfer and conveyancing. A patent may
be assigned in whole or in part or territorially granted. It may be
mortgaged, licensed, transferred by operation of law upon death or
bankruptcy, or held in trust for the benefit of another.
Although the problems of ownership of patents are legion, it is
the purpose of this discussion to illuminate certain unique and complex
problems arising out of the ownership of a patent by two or more
parties.
Generally speaking, a plurality of parties become co-owners or
joint owners of a patent in the same manner in which an individual
becomes the owner of a patent, namely by creation of the patent
through invention and compliance with the statutes or by a transfer of
the patent.
5. Solomons v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 479, 483 (1886).
6. ELLis, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS § 1 (3d ed. 1955).
7. "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor. subject to the conditions and requirements of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
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If two or more persons produce an invention jointly, they become
joint owners thereof and of any resulting patent rights. Also if an inventor assigns an undivided half interest to another the inventor and his
assignee become co-owners. Unless the assignment contains restrictions
on the title so transferred the rights of joint owners created by assignment are identical with those created by joint inventorship. 8
JOINT INVENTORS

Joint property rights in a patent may be created through joint invention.9
The question of whether a person is a sole inventor or a joint inventor can become not only extremely complex but materially important to the parties involved. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, the misjoinder
or nonjoinder of an inventor or inventors in an issued patent were
grounds for invalidation of the patent. 0 Such grounds would arise as
a defense in an infringement action or in a complaint for declaratory

judgment against one who threatens an action for infringement. The
issue of joint invention may also arise in an interference proceeding"
where the issue of priority of invention is determined.' 2 Under the
1952 Patent Act, provision has been made for the correction of an

erroneous misjoinder or nonjoinder of inventors either in the application 13 or in the issued patent, 14 and the misjoinder or nonjoinder of
8. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS § 391 at 416 (3d ed. 1955).
9. "When an invention is made by two or more persons jointly, they shall
apply for a patent jointly and each sign the application and make the required
oath, except as otherwise provided in this title." 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).
10. McKinnon Chain Co. v. American Chain Co., 268 Fed. 353 (3d Cir.
1920); DeLaski & Thropp Circular Woven Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp &
Sons Co., 218 Fed. 458, 463 (D.N.J. 1914, af'd, 226 Fed. 941 (3d Cir. 1915);
1 WALKER, PATENTS § 117-18 (1937).

11. Desch v. Dickinson, 99 U.S.P.Q. 218 (1953).
12. "Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of
the Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any
unexpired patent, he shall give notice thereof to the applicants, or applicant
and patentee, as the case may be. The question of priority of invention shall
be determined by a board of patent interferences. . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1952).
13. "Whenever a person is joined in an application for patent as joint inventor through error, or a joint inventor is not included in an application
through error, and such error arose without any deceptive intention on his
part, the Commissioner may permit the application to be amended accordingly, under such terms as he prescribes." 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1952); PAT. OFF.
R.P. 45; MANUAL OF PATENT EXANINING PROCEDURES § 1111.07 (2d ed. 1953).

14. "Whenever a patent is issued on the application of persons as joint
inventors and it appears that one of such persons was not in fact a joint
inventor, and that he was included as a joint inventor by error and without
any deceptive intention, the Commissioner may, on application of all the
parties and assignees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as
may be imposed, issue a certificate deleting the name of the erroneously
joined person from the patent.
"Whenever a patent is issued and it appears that a person was a joint
inventor, but was omitted by error and without deceptive intention on his
part, the Commissioner may, on application of all the parties and assignees,
with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issue
a certificate adding his name to the patent as a joint inventor.
"The misjoinder or nonjoinder of joint inventors shall not invalidate a
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joint inventors shall not invalidate a patent, provided the error was
made without deceptive intent.
If several persons work toward the development and production of
a new machine, it is possible that one or more of the co-workers may
be an inventor or inventors, or it is possible that all of the co-workers
may be joint inventors. A person or persons merely engaged in
building or constructing the machine are generally considered not to
be an inventor or inventors.
If one man does all the inventing and another does all the constructing,
the first is the sole inventor. But where two or more persons exercise
their inventive faculties in the mutual production of a new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or design, those
persons are joint inventors thereof, regardless of whether one, or part,
or all, or neither of those persons constructed or helped to construct the
first specimen of that thing, or performed or helped to perform the first
instance of that process.1 5

In the DeLaski case, 16 a leading case on joint invention, the judge
stated:
There is some confusion in the cases as to what constitutes joint invention; but, at least as respects a combination patent in which a number
of elements are present, I think these principles may be considered as
settled and sound:
1. In order to constitute two persons joint inventors, it is not necessary
that exactly the same idea should have occurred to each at the same
time, and that they should work out together the embodiment of that
idea in a perfected machine. The conception of the entire device may be
due to one, but if the other makes suggestions of practical value, which

assisted in working out the main idea and making it operative, or contributes an independent part of the entire invention, which is united with
the parts produced by the other and creates the whole, he is a joint
inventor, even though his contribution be of comparatively minor importance and merely the application of an old idea. (Cases cited).
2. If the conception or contribution of one covers a distinct and independent part of the patented device, and is not an element which
contributes to the operativeness of the completed device, or is not included in the claims covering a combination of elements, or is the subject
of a separate claim in the same patent, such person is not a joint in17
ventor.
patent, if such error can be corrected as provided in this section. The court
before which such matter is called in question may order correction of the
patent on notice and hearing of all parties concerned and the Commissioner
shall issue a certificate accordingly." 35 U.S.C. § 256 (1952).
"This section is new and is companion to section 116.
"The first two paragraphs provide for the correction of the inadvertent
joining or nonjoining of a person as a joint inventor. The third paragraph
provides that a patent shall not be invalid for such cause, and also provides
that a court may order correction of a patent; the two sentences of this
paragraph are independent." I.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
15. 1 WALKER. PATENTS § 114, at 399-400 (1937).
16. DeLaski & Thropp Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 Fed.
458 (D.N.J. 1914).
17. Id. at 463-65.
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In the DeLaski case, the plaintiffs were joint inventors of a machine
for wrapping automobile tires upon which they jointly obtained
Patent No. 1,011,450. As a defense to a charge of infringement, the
defendant urged that the patent was invalid because it was granted
for an invention which was in fact the sole invention of the plaintiff,
Thropp. The facts disclosed that the plaintiff, DeLaski, was in the
employ of the plaintiff, Thropp, as a draftsman; that the plaintiff,
Thropp, conceived most of the machine and the plaintiff, DeLaski,
contributed some parts, namely, the tension on the bobbin, the throwing of the shafts, and the shape of the device which supports the upper
set of rollers. The court held that "for all that appears, any one or all
of the things which DeLaski did contribute may have been the very
thing or things necessary to complete the invention and make the
machine operative ....
if DeLaski did invent these particular devices,
it follows, under the principles above stated, that he was a joint
8
inventor.'
Judge Woolley of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in affirming the above DeLaski decision held:
One may conceive a general or imperfect outline of an entirely novel

thing, which, without the conception of another developing it and giving
it body, might never amount to invention; but if the conceptions of one
supplement and complement the conceptions of the other, the result
might be invention and therefore joint invention. 'When a claim covers
a series of steps or a number of elements in a combination, the invention
may well be joint, though some of the steps or some of the elements may
have come as a thought of but one.' Quincey vs. Krause, 151 Fed. 1012,
1017, 81 C.C.A. 290; American vs. Wood (C.C.) 189 Fed. 391, 395.19

The Court in Welsbach Light Co. v. Cosmopolitan Incandescent
Light Co. 20 held a patent to be invalid because one feature of it was
conceived by only one of the two who worked out the entire invention. This decision has been criticized by Hoar who states that "it
would be impossible to hold that two individuals could jointly participate in inventing a structure, as it must necessarily happen that
some of the concepts representing various steps in the invention
should occur first to one and then to the other, and yet the invention
' 21
as a whole be the joint product of the two."
Hoar further pursues the logical consequences of the above holding
by suggesting a case involving four or five inventors, various combinations of whom are responsible for each of the elements which enter
into the joint invention. He suggests that under such circumstances,
18. Id. at 465.
19. William R. Thropp & Sons Co. v. DeLaski & Thropp Circular Woven
Tire Co.. 226 Fed. 941, 949 (3d Cir. 1915).
20. 104 Fed. 83, 86 (7th Cir. 1900).
21. HOAR, PATENT TAcTIcs & LAW 54-55 (1940).
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the combinations and permutations of inventors could produce as many
as thirty-one distinct patent applications to cover the subject-matter22
ordinarily included in a single application filed by only one inventor.
It has already been pointed out that where the suggestions of an
employee amounted to a material contribution toward the invention,
the employee is properly included as a joint inventor. 23 On the other
hand, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Agawam Woolen
Co. v. Jordan2 4 held that where one employs other persons to assist
him in carrying out his invention, and during their experimentation,
one or more of the employees
make valuable discoveries ancillary to the plan and preconceived design
of the employer, such suggested improvements are in general to be regarded as the property of the party who discovered the original improved
principle, and may be embodied in his patent as a part of his invention.
Persons employed, as much as employers, are entitled to their own
independent inventions, but where the employer has conceived the plan
of an invention and is engaged in experiments to perfect it, no suggestions
from an employee, not amounting to a new method or arrangement, which,
in itself is a complete invention, is sufficient to deprive the employer of
the exclusive property in the perfected improvement. But where the
suggestions go to make up a complete and perfect machine, embracing
the substance of all that is embodied in the patent subsequently issued
invalid,
to the party to whom the suggestions were made, the patent is
25
because the real invention or discovery belonged to another.
In the Agawam case, an employee, Winslow, suggested and incorporated spools or bobbins in place of cans in the sole patentee's textile
machinery in order that the rovings could be wound upon and spun
from the spools or bobbins instead of being spun from the cans. The
Court held that valuable though this suggestion was it could not be
regarded as such a material part of the invention as to constitute Winslow a joint inventor, and therefore the patent was valid.
The principle that an inventor who eventually obtains a patent is
entitled to incorporate in his specification suggestions of others who
were working with him was followed in the case of Becton-Dickinson
& Co. v. Robert P. Scherer Corp.26 where the theories for a needleless
syringe, operating upon the principle of jet propulsion of fluid through
skin, were advanced by Lockhart originally for discussion and suggestions from two other employees of the Cambridge Instrument Company. The court found that Gillett and Picciana, the other two em22. Id. at 55
23. DeLaski & Thropp Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 Fed.
458 (D.N.J. 1914).
24. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 583 (1869).
25. Id. at 602-03.
26. 106 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Mich. 1952).
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ployees, were merely helpers carrying out Lockhart's instructions and
not co-inventors.
Walker further elaborates on the status of suggestions to an inventor:
In order to make an invention of importance, a considerable fund of

general knowledge must be possessed by the inventor. Where that fund
was acquired before he undertook his invention, it is easy to see that
those who imparted it, are not thereby made joint inventors with him.
Though not quite so obvious, it is equally certain that if, pending his
experiments an inventor seeks and secures one point of information
from a scientist, and another from a machinist, and a third from a book,
he is not, on account of having done the first two, any less a sole inventor
than he is on account of having done the last. (O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 How.
62, 111, 14 L. Ed. 601 (1853).)27

If one person merely suggests an idea, without suggesting any means
for practicing the idea, to another who does devise such means, then
28
the second person is the sole inventor.
29
In an interference proceeding between an employee, Fersing, and
his employer, Fast, before the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,
it was held that no inventive ideas were suggested by the employee,
Fersing, and that any work done by Fersing on the invention inured
to the benefit of Fast. The court acknowledged, however, a converse
broad principle of law in which suggestions made by an employer to
his employee should be credited to the employee-inventor, citing
Gedge v. Cromwell.30
Another interesting facet of the question of joint invention occurs
where joint inventors have assigned all their right, title and interest
in their patent to an assignee, and it can be shown that only one of
the alleged joint inventors was in fact the sole inventor. The DeLaski
case held that, even if the joint inventorship of DeLaski and Thropp
could not be upheld, the patent could still not be invalidated because
it was granted to their assignee rather than to the original applicants,
stating that the reason for the rule of invalidation of a patent because
of misjoinder of the inventors no longer existed. "If one of the original
applicants for the patent was the sole inventor, and joined in the assignment, the person to whom the assignment was made was an
assignee of the inventor, and the mere joining of the other assignor
cannot, on any principle, invalidate the assignment ...."31
In the case of Liquid Carbonic Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
27. 1 WALKER, PATENTS § 115, at 402-03 (1937).
28. HOAR, PATENT TAcTIcs & LAW 56 (1940).

29. Fersing v. Fast, 28 C.C.P.A. (Patents) 1318, 121 F.2d 531 (1941).
30. 19 App. D.C. 192 (1902).

31. DeLaski & Thropp Tire Co. v. William R. Thropp & Sons Co., 218 Fed.
at 465 (D.N.J. 1914).
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Co.,32 among other things the plaintiff sought an assignment of the
Freeman Patent No. 2,066,265 from the defendant on the grounds that
the invention belonged to the plaintiff and was disclosed to the defendant in confidence when the plaintiff was invited into the defendant's
plant to demonstrate its method of curing tires. On petition for rehearing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was previously overruled, the defendant alleged that the grounds upon which
the plaintiff demanded an assignment of the patent invalidated the
patent because it was not issued to the true inventor. In overruling
the petition on the grounds that equitable jurisdiction would supersede
"the dialectic of technical Patent Law," the court went further and
suggested that the complaint describes joint and cooperative experiments and research, and therefor the question of joint invention and
joint patent could still be raised at the trial. In approving the rule of
the DeLaski case which held that a patent granted to the assignee of
two applicants therefor as joint inventors is valid, although one was
sole inventor, the court raised the question "might not the reverse be
also true and a patent held good which was granted to one even though
two were the joint inventors . . . ?-33 In attempting to answer this
question, the court made the following analogy:
If, while two men are engaged in a joint enterprise, one of them should
surreptitiously appropriate valuable property developed or discovered,
and fabricate a bill of sale in his own name, would a court of equity
refuse jurisdiction of the other man's petition for an assignment of
his interest because the bill of sale is a forgery and therefore invalid?
Should the question be answered differently if the property appropriated
is an invention and, instead of a bill of sale, the defendant has letters
patent?34
The court here is dealing with the problem of hostile parties, each
claiming the invention as his own, when in fact .he invention is
probably joint, an issue which will be raised only by the party having
the weakest claim in order to destroy the patent for either party.
Under the 1952 Patent Act, 35 the court would have no difficulty in
aligning the parties without invalidating the patent.
In the case of Kendall Co. v. Tetley Tea Co. 36 where invalidation of
a joint patent was sought on the grounds that the invention was a sole
invention of only one joint applicant, the court rejected the argument
of the DeLaski case that the rule of invalidity
should be inapplicable where the patent is issued directly to the assignee
of the purported joint inventors. It is difficult to see how the assignee
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

38 F. Supp. 520 (N.D. Ohio 1941).
Id. at 526.
Id. at 526-27.
35 U.S.C. § 256 (1952).
189 F.2d 558 (1st Cir. 1951).
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could stand any better than his assignors; if a patent must be issued to
the inventor, not to the inventor and another, it would seem that the
application for the patent must be signed by the inventor, not by the
inventor and another, whether or not the patent is issued directly to an
37
assignee.
However, the court in the Kendall case went on to hold that the
"defense is a technical one regarded with disfavor by the Courts and
requiring very clear and convincing proof to sustain it. Klein v.
American Casting & Mfg. Corp., 2 Cir., 1937, 87 F.2d 291, 294."38 The
court confirmed the district court holding of invalidity on other
grounds, but reversed its holding on the question of joint invention
upon the basis that it was the joint work of both inventors that brought
forth the actual product described in the patent, even though one of
the inventors had by himself previously developed a method which
was subsequently used by both inventors.
It is interesting to note that the rationale in the Kendall case opposing the DeLaski rule concerning the assignee of joint inventors appears
to be unduly technical, whereas the opinion in the DeLaski case
seemed to be more reasonably developed from a concern for the
equities of the parties.
In the more recent case of Pointer v. Six Wheel Corp.,39 the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit cited the ruling in the Agawam case
but added the following contribution to the law of joint invention:
Here, the only basis for the claim of joint invention lies in the fact
that the Knox device was an addition to, and an improvement upon, the
Stebbins structure. If that were enough to make the invention joint, every
'improvement' which is claimed solely by the improver could be invalidated upon showing that it was grafted upon a prior structure. And the
great body of improvement patents, which represents, perhaps, the most
important contribution to patents in the field of mechanics could be entirely destroyed. In truth, the improver could be compelled to take in
the inventor of the prior structure, whether his invention was merely
disclosed in a patent or actually reduced to practice, lest some one, in
the future, seek to invalidate the improvement patent upon the ground
that it was not his sole invention. This is not the law. ...
Here, there is no voluntary pooling of ideas. Knox's suggestions were
rejected by Stebbins. He considered his own invention complete and
insisted that the improvements would not work. ...
So, the claim of joint invention was properly rejected. 40 (Emphasis
added)
The case of Allegheny Steel & Brass Co. v. Elting,41 involved an
action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity of Design Patent No.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562.
177 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1949).
Id. at 157-58.
141 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1944).
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118,968 issued to the defendant for "Arm for Lamp Fixtures." The
defendant had paid one Thomas Raichel $25 for making the patented
design for him. However, since the defendant gave Raichel no idea
or suggestion as to what form of design he should prepare, it was held
that Raichel was the true inventor and not the defendant. Moreover,
it was found that as the relationship between the defendant and
Raichel was not that of an employer and employee, and that Raichel
was an independent contractor in the art of designing, the invention
did not belong to the defendant, and the design patent was held invalid.
In the case of Reddi-Wip, Inc. v. Knapp-Monarch Co.,42 where the
employment relation did exist, the plaintiff and defendant entered
into a business relationship to develop a device which the defendant
could manufacture and sell to the plaintiff and which the plaintiff
could, in turn, sell to the public. Although the issue of joint invention
or joint patent did not arise, the court concluded from the record that
both the plaintiff and the defendant had made substantial contributions to the development of the valve and that the exact proportions of
the contribution were impossible to determine. The question was one
solely of title and the complaint sought equitable relief, the plaintiff
claiming to be the sole owner of the valve design and the equitable
owner of the defendant's patent application. Each party had filed a
patent application in the Patent Office and an interference had been
declared. The court held that the defendant's patent application must
be assigned to the plaintiff because the plaintiff employed the defendant specifically to develop the valve for the plaintiff. Since a
patent had not issued upon the valve to either the plaintiff or the defendant, it may be assumed that in the light of this decision, the
appropriate correction of the parties was made in the interference
proceedings to show who the actual inventors were, and if otherwise
in condition for allowance, a patent would issue to the plaintiff as
the assignee of the patent application.
In the case of Cohen v. Bunin,43 the plaintiff contended that he was
the joint inventor with the defendant of a puppet for producing
animated colored pictures. He brought an action to compel assignment
of a half interest in the patent obtained solely by the defendant and
to compel an accounting of one-half of the profits derived therefrom.
The court held that because the plaintiff and defendant had worked
together in the plaintiff's workshop for a period of fifteen months and
collaborated together to develop the puppet, there was a joint invention of the parties. The defendant argued that if the invention was
joint, then under the law the patent was void; moreover, the court
42. 104 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Mo. 1952).

43. 47 N.Y.S.2d 414 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
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being a state court had no jurisdiction to declare the patent invalid,
and could not compel the assignment of a voidable patent from the
defendant to the plaintiff. In overcoming this contention, the court
said:
In the first place, there is no procedure in the Federal court by which
a joint inventor can have a patent taken out by his co-inventor declared
invalid. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall. 434,439; ....
In the second place,
one in the position of this plaintiff is not required to take action which
would result in invalidating the patent. It was settled by the United
States Supreme Court in Becher v. Contoure Laboratories, Inc., 279 U.S.
388 .

.

. Mr. Justice Holmes writing for a unanimous Court, and in effect

overruling the decision of the divided court in Kennedy v. Hazelton,
supra, that a plaintiff having a right to an invention or patent may proceed in the State court to compel an assignment of the patent despite
the fact that the evidence establishing the plaintiff's right would establish
the invalidity of the patent if that were the issue and if the forum were
one vested with jurisdiction over that issue. As stated by the court in
Liquid Carbonic Corporation v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., D.C., 38 F.
Supp. 520, 526, the dialectic of technical patent law does not place the subject of an invention beyond the pale of general equitable jurisdiction.
This plaintiff is entitled through this court to be put in the position
that he would be in if this patent had been taken out as a joint invention.
He would then have an undivided half interest in the patent, the right
to use it and to license others to use it without accounting to the defendant. By the same token the defendant might use it and license others
to use it without accounting to the plaintiff ....

44

Accordingly the New York Supreme Court ordered the defendent to
assign a one half interest in the patent to the plaintiff, but refused
to require an accounting to the plaintiff for any profits which he
derived from the use of the patent.
An interesting problem involving the issue of joint invention arose
in a recent interference proceeding 45 involving the priority of the
pioneer invention in a calculating machine incorporating an electronic
tube circuit. The senior party, Arthur H. Dickinson, filed his application on January 20, 1940, which was assigned to International Business
Machines Corporation (IBM). The junior party, Joseph R. Desch, filed
his application on March 6, 1946, which was assigned to the National
Cash Register Company (NCR). In order for the junior party, Desch,
to be awarded the patent, he must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he made the invention before the senior party, Dickinson. In order to prove that certain work performed by Desch between
April and August of 1939 was the invention in controversy, Desch required the corroborating testimony of another employee of NCR,
Mumma. However, at the time the interference was declared, NCR's
44. Id. at 417-18.
45. Desch v. Dickinson, 99 U.S.P.Q. 218 (1953).
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application in interference was in the names of Desch and Mumma,
jointly. Later, NCR found records which it planned to rely upon in
establishing Desch as sole inventor at an earlier date. In accordance
with the liberal practice of conversion of a joint to a sole application
in an interference proceeding, the NCR application was converted.
However, the Board still had to review the question as to whether
or not Mumma was a joint inventor. If so, Mumma as a joint applicant
could not be used as a corroborating witness, and also the first date
of invention would have to be the later date when Desch and Mumma
jointly conceived as opposed to the earlier date when Desch alone
may have conceived the invention. The testimony revealed that
neither Desch nor Mumma had any particular thoughts on who was
the sole or joint inventor, because they left this up to the NCR patent
department. The Board held that in view of all the facts and circumstances, Mumma was a joint inventor with Desch. Although Mumma
was employed under Desch and assigned to the project of developing
an electronic calculator and Desch described the general plan, Mumma
developed the machine involving many of the problems which arose
as he went along. Consequently, because the junior party, Desch,
failed to establish conception or to prove reduction to practice of the
invention by fully corroborative testimony prior to the filing date of
the application of the senior party, Dickinson, priority of invention was
awarded to the senior party, Dickinson, assignor to IBM.
The joint invention of plants presents some unique problems because
under the statutes 46 a plant patent is granted to whoever (1) invents
or discovers and (2) asexually reproduces any distinct and new
variety of plant.
In a case of first impression decided in 1945, the Patent Office Board
of Appeals construed the issue of joint invention as it related to the
plant patent statute. 47 The joint applicants, Johan Hendrik Kluis and
Anthony Kluis, appealed a rejection by the Examiner of their application for a new rose variety. Two oaths were filed with the application.
The first oath averred that both inventors believed themselves to be
joint inventors and asexual reproducers of the rose, and later averred
that the rose was invented or discovered by Johan and was asexually
reproduced by Anthony Kluis. The second oath averred that Johan
believed that he was the first and sole inventor and that Anthony
believed he was the first and sole asexual reproducer. The Board held
that although the plant patent statute requires the performance of
46. "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct
and new variety of plant . . . other than a tuberpropagated plant . . . may

obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title." 35 U.S.C. § 161 (1952).
47. Ex parte Kluis and Kluis, 70 U.S.P.Q. 165, (1945).
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two distinct acts, namly invention or discovery, and asexual reproduction, it did not think that
a reasonable construction of the statute requires that at all times and
for all purposes both parties be in each other's presence like 'Siamese
Twins' at each stage in the development of the invention or that they
jointly perform every act like a mirror image and its object. We do not
see that the oaths make any averment inconsistent with legal joint invention or with the presumption that both were cooperating, and possibly
jointly consulting, and proceeding by mutual effort towards production
47a
of a new rose.
The Board also commented that since there was no precedent bearing
on this question in the plant patent law, that analogies should be
drawn from the law on mechanical patents.
In the case of Bourne v. Jones, 48 where joint invention was proved
to invalidate a patent issued to only one of the joint inventors, the
court looked to the law of chemical patents rather than that of mechanical patents. In this case, the question was solely that of invention,
since there was no positive evidence overcoming the presumption
that the patentee, Bourne, was the one who first asexually reproduced
the plant, namely sugar cane. On the question of invention it was
shown that Bourne took the initial step in developing the sugar cane
plant by making the crosses, harvesting and planting the seed, setting
out the seedlings and making certain tests on the seedlings. Later
during the development of the seeds, he would take half the seed
pieces for the purposes of his pathological tests, for which he was
hired, and gave the other half to the alleged joint inventor, Stephens,
for his agronomic tests. Stephens made further tests on the seed pieces
to determine the characteristics of the sugar cane, and it was from
these tests that the selection of the patented varieties were made.
The Court held:
Ordinarily, invention is construed to mean a mental operation involving

the conception of an idea, and a physical operation involving reduction
to practice of the mental concept. (See C.J.S. Patents Sec. 53a) In this
suit, from the point of view of the invention, we have a situation remarkably similar to the situation involved in the invention of a chemical compound. Because the properties or utilities of a new chemical compound
can not be definitely determined until the compound has been produced
and tested for utility, it is usually held in such cases that conception and
reduction to practice are simultaneous acts taking place at the time the
characteristics and the utility of the compound are isolated and identified.
... A scientific prediction of the compound's properties or utilities does not
make the compound patentable.... Consequently, there could be no invention or discovery of these patented varieties of sugar cane prior to the time
47a. Id. at 166.
48. 98 U.S.P.Q. 206 (S.D. Fla. 1951).
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the plants were grown and their characteristics determined. . . It is
concluded, therefore, that Stephens and Bourne were joint inventors. 4 9

Since the 1952 Patent Act amended the Code by providing that the
erroneous misjoinder or nonjoinder of joint inventors shall not invalidate a patent, the harshness of the previous rule has been eliminated, and inventors and corporate employers are no longer penalized
for poor judgment in the selection of the applicants or patentees of
their inventions, so long as such selections are erroneous and without
any deceptive intention. The rule, of course, would apparently still
hold true for those who would intentionally join more or less than
the actual number of true inventors.
The cases have shown that where the inventors are apparently
joint, but hostile, and one of the inventors applies for a patent, still
the courts will step in and adjudicate the equities of the parties without regard to the technical rule of invalidation of the patent for nonjoinder of inventors. However, the elimination of the technical rule
will eliminate any further consideration or grounds for doubt in such
situations.
Section 256 of title 35 is also a boon to the patent departments of
those corporations having large research and development programs,
employing numerous scientists and technicans who cooperate on many
and varied projects. Although the DeLaski case would not apply the
technical rule of invalidation where more than the number of actual
inventors had assigned their interests to a common assignee, still the
DeLaski decision did not go so far as to apply the rule where the
number of assignors were less than the actual number of inventors.
Even though the penalty of invalidation for misjoinder or nonjoinder
has been relaxed, the cases prior to 1952 deciding the issues of joint
invention still have some value as a guide to the practitioner in advising his clients of their joint and sole rights in their inventions and
patents.
JOINT OWNERS

Joint ownership of a patent may be established by other means
than joint inventorship, such as by conveyance or by operation of law.
However, regardless of how the joint estate is created, the rights of the
joint parties are the same.
Although Walker 50 -nd some of the earlier cases 5' refer to such an
estate as a tenancy in common, a tenancy in common of a patent right
departs in many respects from a tenancy in common of other types of
personal property. If there are two joint owners of a patent, each has
49. Id. at 209-10.
50. 2 WALKER, PATENTS §§ 363-64, at 1149-51 (1937).
51. Clum v. Brewer, 5 Fed. Cas. 1097, No. 2909 (C.C.D. Mass. 1855); Vose v.
Singer, 86 Mass. (4 Allen) 226 (1862).
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a one-half undivided interest in the patent. If there are three patentees
or three joint owners, each has a one-third undivided interest in the
patent. The relative rights in these respective fractional interests in a
patent are unique in the law of joint property. Except in limited
situations, the owner of a one-tenth interest, the owner of a ninetenths interest, and the owner of a one-thousandths interest have the
same rights in a patent.
The controlling principle of this aspect of patent property law was
codified under the 1952 Act: "In the absence of any agreement to the
contrary, each of the joint owners of a patent may make, use or sell
the patented invention without the consent of and without accounting
'52
to the other owners.
This principle, which has startled practitioners more familiar with
other types of property law, has been repeated in many decisions
over a long period of time, with very few exceptions. An excellent
treatment of the history and reasoning of the law was presented by
Judge Wood of the Seventh Circuit in the case of Blackledge v. Weir
& Craig Mfg. Co.53 This case involved a series of assignments originating with the two joint patentees, Cunning and Woolen, of Patent
No. 373,353 for a "Device for Scraping Hogs." One patentee assigned
his one-half interest to the plaintiff for the use of the plaintiff's insane
ward, Moses Crawford. The other patentee, Woolen, assigned his onehalf interest to Silberhorn. The plaintiff and Silberhorn jointly granted
to the defendant the right to manufacture and sell the patented device
for a period of five years in consideration for a royalty of $600 on each
machine, $300 to the plaintiff and $300 to Silberhorn. One year later,
Silberhorn assigned his entire one-half interest to the defendant. When
the five-year grant had terminated, the defendant ceased to pay any
more royalties, although he continued to manufacture, use and sell
the patented machine, and the plaintiff brought suit to recover one-half
of the defendant's receipts from this continued manufacture, use and
sale. Judge Woods affirmed the lower court's judgment for the de54
fendant.
After noting the confusion in the American cases on joint property
rights and the absence of any statutory regulations preventing one
owner from using the invention without the consent of the co-owner,
Judge Woods stated, "To ingraft such a meaning upon the statute by
construction would be promotive of injustice, because it would put
the enterprising owner at the mercy of the drone, visionary, or knave
with whom he should find himself associated."55
52. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1952).

53. 108 Fed. 71 (7th Cir. 1901).
54. Ibid.
55. Id. at 73.
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In supporting his opinion, Judge Woods referred back to the English
cases which were more uniform in permitting the independent use of
an invention by a co-owner without the consent of and without accounting to his other co-owner. Quoting the Lord Chancellor (Cranworth) in Mathers v. Green,56 the Court said:
'I can discover no principle for such a doctrine. It would enable one
of two patentees, either to prevent the use of the invention altogether,
or else compel the other patentee to risk his skill and capital in the use
of the invention on the terms of his being accountable for half the profit,
if profit should be made, without being able to call on his co-patentees for
contribution if there should be a loss. This would be to place the parties
in a relation to each other which, I think, no Court can assume to have
been intended, in the absence of express contract to that effect.'57
Reaching the same results, but by different reasoning, the Lord
Chancellor (Herschel) in Steers v. Rogers58 said:
'What is the right which a patentee has, or patentees have? It has been
spoken of as though a patent right were a chattel or analogous to a
chattel. The truth is that letters patent do not give the patentee any
right to use the invention. They do not confer upon him a right to manufacture according to his invention. That is a right which he would have
equally effectually if there were no letters patent at all, only in that
case the world would equally have the right. What the letters patent
confer is the right to exclude others from manufacturing in a particular
way and using a particular invention. When that is borne in mind it appears to me very clear that it would be impossible to hold under these
circumstances that, where there are several patentees, either of them, if he
uses the patent, can be called upon by the others to pay them a portion of
the profits which he makes by that manufacture, because they are all
of them, or perhaps any of them is, entitled to prevent the rest of the
world from using it.'59

Lord Chancellor Herschel's analysis of inventions and patent rights
is still valid today. Under our common law of inventions, the inventor
has the exclusive right to make and sell his invention, so long as it is
not disclosed to the public, at which time anyone is free to make, use
and sell his invention. Under our federal statutes, only "the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States" is granted to the patentee.6 0 (Emphasis added)
Judge Woods also cited Vose v. Singer,61 which rejected the analogies of joint ownership of real estate and personal property and
joint ownership of patent property, saying that "because the tenant
in common of the grain or liquor, who uses it exclusively and consumes
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

L.R. 1 Ch. 29 (1865).
108 Fed. at 73.
[18933 A.C. 232.
Id. at 235.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
86 Mass. (4 Allen) 226 (1862).
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it in using, is liable, therefore the part owner of a patent is liable,"
would not be a safe conclusion. The Vose court also suggested that
actually there was a possibility that the part owner of the patent
might use it so extensively that the value of the whole patent would
be enhanced. Reasoning further, it stated:
It is difficult to see how an equitable right of contribution can exist among
any of them, unless it includes all the parties interested and extends
through the whole term of the patent right; and if there be a claim for
contribution of profits, there should also be a correlative claim for losses,
and an obligation upon each party to use due diligence in making his
interest profitable. It is not and cannot be intended that these parties are
co-partners; but the idea of mutual contribution for profits and losses
would require even more than co-partnership. Nothing short of the relation of stockholders in a joint-stock company would meet the exigencies
of parties whose interests may be thus transferred and subdivided. 62
Judge Woods further elaborated that each co-owner had an individual right, and that the exercise of this individual right whether
it be by manufacture, sale or granting licenses or assigning interests
in the patent will not make him accountable to his other co-owners,
because the other co-owners have their own separate rights which
remain unaffected and which they are equally free to use in the same
manner if they wish.
The Blackledge case was not only followed but commended by the
court in LaLance & Grosjean Mfg. Co. v. National Enameling &
Stamping Co.63 in holding that a part owner of a patent cannot maintain a suit for infringement against the grantee of his co-owner, even
though the plaintiff had not given his consent to the conveyance. It
was further held that there was not sufficient evidence to establish
a contract whereby the original co-owners had agreed not to convey
their interest without the consent of each other.
Although the case of Aspinwall Mfg. Co. v. Gill,64 has been cited
to the contrary, the court merely speculated as to the accountability
between joint owners of a patent, but actually held that the owner of
one-eleventh of a patent cannot sue the owner of eight-elevenths of
the same patent for infringement. On the accountability of joint owners, the court said,
The exact mutual rights of part owners of a patent have never yet been
authoritatively settled. If one part owner derives a profit from the patent,
either by using the invention, or getting royalties for its use, or purchase
money for sale of rights, it would seem that he would be accountable
to the other part owners for their portion of such profit. And probably
a bill for an account would be sustained therefor. But this is matter of
62. Id. at 232.
63. 108 Fed. 77 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1901).
64. 32 Fed. 697 (C.C.N.J. 1887).
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mere speculation, so far as this case is concerned. It is clear, I think, that
one part owner cannot maintain suit against another for infringement. 65

A few old decisions have held that one co-owner of a patented invention may be guilty of infringement against the others.6 6 In Bell &
Howell Company v. Bliss, 67 the court criticized the Herring case,68
saying: "The reasons thus given for the decision are not at all persuasive. If a tenant in common, by virtue of joint ownership, 'has a
right to use the patent,' as conceded in this opinion, we are at an utter
loss to understand why 'he has not the right to infringe the same.'
The contrary conclusion is supported by numerous authorities ..... ,69
It would follow that, since each co-owner of a patent may make, use
or sell the invention without the consent of, and without accounting to
the other owners, each co-owner has the right to license a patent to
another, and the assignee or licensee is stepping *into the shoes of his
licensor with the same rights to make, use or sell the patented
invention without the consent of and without accounting to any of the'
other co-owners. Such is the law, 70 and a license from one co-owner
is a complete defense to an infringement action against the licensee
by any of the other co-owners, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary of which the licensee has notice. If there is an agreement
between the co-owners that licensing will occur only with the consent
of the other co-owners, then the damaged co-owners must seek their
remedy against the co-owner who is the licensor and not the licensee.
This principle was decided by the Circuit Court of Delaware in 1894
in the case of Pusey & Jones Co. v. Miller.1 In this case, there were
three co-owners, one of whom had licensed the plaintiff. By way of
a bill of interpleader, the plaintiff sought relief from conflicting demands of two of the co-owners, including the plaintiff's licensor. The
court held that the licensee of a patent controlled by two or more coowners is liable to his licensor only and not to the other co-owners,
unless otherwise stipulated.
Another leading case on this subject is Talbot v. Quaker-State Oil
Refining Co.,72 in which co-ownership of Patent No. 1,890,421 for a
nonrefillable drum for storing lubricating oil was established by an
assignment from one plaintiff, Talbot, the sole patentee, of an undivided one-half interest to the other plaintiff, Mann. An executed
written agreement accompanied the assignment in which those parties
65. Id. at 702.
66. American Tel. &Tel. Co. v. Radio Audion Co., 281 Fed. 200 (D. Del. 1922);
Herring v. Gas Consumers Ass'n, 9 Fed. 556 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).
67. 262 Fed. 131, 136 (7th Cir. 1919).
68. Herring v. Gas Consumers Ass'n, 9 Fed. 556 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1878).
69. 262 Fed. at 136.
70. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS § 397 (3d ed. 1955).

71. 61 Fed. 401 (C.C.D. Del. 1894).
72. 104 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1939).
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agreed that neither would dispose of his share of the invention without
the written consent of the other and also provided for a sharing of
profits resulting from a disposition of the invention. Shortly thereafter,
the plaintiff, Talbot, was hired by the defendant specifically to adapt
his invention for use by the defendant. In another action between the
parties to this suit, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had held that
the plaintiff, Talbot, licensed the defendant to use these inventions by
virtue of his employment relationship.72a The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit held that the license of the plaintiff, Talbot to the
defendant was a complete defense to an action for infringement by
either or both the co-owners, because the defendant had no notice of
the agreement concerning licensing between the co-owners. In supporting its holding, the court distinguished between patents and other
types of property held by co-tenants saying that:
[B]etween cotenants of land or other tangible property there is neither
privity nor identity of interest, and a judgment rendered in a suit affecting the common property brought by or against only one of the cotenants
is not binding upon his associate. Property in patents, however, is of a
peculiar character and, while the theory of separate and distinct undivided interests is preserved, there is actually a much closer interrelationship between the rights of co-owners and a much nearer approach
to substantial identity of interests than with tangibles or ordinary choses
in action. In its essence all that the Government confers by the patent
is the right to exclude others from making, using or vending the invention
(Crown Co. v. Nye Tool Works, 261 U.S. 24, 35), and as to this essential
attribute of the property each joint owner is in a very real sense at the
mercy of any other ....
This unlimited right to license others may, for
all practical purposes, destroy the monopoly and so amount to an appropriation of the whole value of the patent. Vose v. Singer, 4 Allen
(Mass.) 226, 230.73

The court in holding a lack of requirement of privity to establish res
judicata in a case involving a joint ownership of patents, compared
such a relationship more with that of a principal and agent rather than
the case of ordinary co-tenants. The fact that the plaintiff, Mann,
testified as a witness for his co-owner, Talbot, in the state action which
established the license, probably influenced the Court of Appeals
somewhat in this decision.
By the same token, the licensee cannot be heard to deny his obligation to his licensor, because of lack of consent of the licensor's coowner in accordance with an agreement between the co-owners, and
this has been so held in Miller v. 0. B. McClintock Co.74 While the
co-owner (Hessel) in this case had not given his written consent, he
had given the defendant a separate license to operate under his share
72a. Quaker State Oil Co. v. Talbot, 322 Pa. 155, 185 Atl. 586 (1936).
73. 104 F.2d at 968.
74. 210 Minn. 152, 297 N.W. 724 (1941).
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of the patent, thus in effect consenting to the license by the plaintiff's
father. "The separate licenses by them of their separate shares was
the same in legal effect as a single license covering the whole of the
75
patent."
Where a suit was brought against one co-owner of an undivided
interest to restrain him from sending infringement notices to plaintiff's
customers, the injunction granted was not binding on the other coowner, because the other co-owner was neither the agent nor the employee of the defendant.76 By comparing this case with the Talbot case,
it may be seen that whether or not the action of one co-owner is res
judicata with respect to another co-owner depends on the particular
facts of each case.
The independent rights of one co-owner to make, use, sell and
license the patented invention without consent of and without accounting to the other co-owner inures to the benefit of his representa7
tives or successors upon death.
Although section 362 of title 35 of the United States Code implies
that an agreement to the contrary will circumvent the codified law
of joint ownership of patents, the Talbot case has shown that agreements are not always effective. In addition to simple agreements
between the co-owners, it is interesting to note the effect of a partnership, a corporation, a joint venture and a trust upon the property
rights of joint owners of a patent.
In the Pusey case, 78 which held that the licensee of a patent from
one of several co-owners was liable only to his licensor, the court
first had to investigate a partnership agreement in order to establish
the rights of the co-owners. In this case, Taylor, the sole patentee of
an invention for a cotton press, assigned to Miller and Boardman a
one-third undivided interest each. After Miller and Boardman had
both died, the patentee, Taylor, assigned his remaining one-third
interest to one of the defendants, Bierce. The plaintiff was the licensee
of Miller. The court found that a partnership had existed between
Taylor, Miller and Boardman and that the partnership agreement
specified that each of the partners was entitled to one-third of the
income realized by the partnership from the patent. However, since
there had been no agreement between the partners as to the disposition of the partnership property upon the death of any of the
partners, the partnership dissolved immediately upon the death of
Boardman. The court further held that the interest in the patent was
owned and held by each member of the partnership as his own indi75. 297 N.W. at 730.
76. McCall Co. v. Bladworth, 290 Fed. 365 (2d Cir. 1923);

ASSIGNmENTS § 402 (3d ed. 1955).
77. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS

§ 399 (3d ed. 1955).
78. Pusey & Jones Co. v. Miller, 61 Fed. 401 (C.C.D. Del. 1894).
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vidual and separate property and constituted no part of the firm's
assets. Therefore, upon dissolution of the partnership each one of
the surviving members was no longer accountable to the other as a
partner for the division of profits which he might thereafter make
from the working of the patent itself, and thus the rights of the parties
reverted to that of co-owners alone rather than co-partners. Since
the defendant had been licensed by Miller after the dissolution of
the partnership, the law governing co-owners applied, rendering the
defendant liable only to his licensor, Miller.
In the case of Drake v. Hall,79 the plaintiff and defendant were jointpatentees and also partners. After stating the rule of nonaccountability
between co-tenants of a patent, the court added that the patentees
could change the nature of their ownership by agreement, establishing
a co-partnership business for the manufacture and sale of goods under
the patent and authorizing relief between the parties for an accounting
of profits and losses arising in the business. However, the evidence
showed that the partnership was later dissolved, and by agreement all
the assets except the patent were sold to the defendant. Under a
separate agreement, it was acknowledged that the plaintiff and defendant were still co-owners of the patent and that the defendant
would have the exclusive use of the patent for a period of one year
with an option to extend the agreement for another ten years. After
the first year had expired, the defendant did not exercise the option
but continued to manufacture and use the patented products. In a
suit for accounting, the court held that since the plaintiff and defendant were no longer partners and because the option had not been
exercised, there was no agreement to prevent the law governing coownership of a patent to apply. Therefore, the defendant was not
accountable to the plaintiff.
Whereas the Pusey case held that the patent was the individual property of the three partners and not a part of the firm's assets, the
recent case of Gruber v. United States8o held that "Under Oregon law,
partners do not own any specific part of the firm's assets, but merely
have a share in the profits and surplus. ORS 68.430; (Claude v. Claude,
191 Or. 308, 228 P.2nd 776, reh den. 230 P.2nd 211 (1951)." Gruber
v. United States was a tax case in which the *sole patentee, Gruber,
assigned an undivided one-half interest in the patent to a partnership
called Sawyer's, as compensation for their assistance in developing
and promoting the patent. In 1946, in order to expand their operation,
the Sawyer's partnership assigned their one-half interest to Western
Photo Supply Company, a corporation, in exchange for an exclusive
license back to produce under the patent. Later in 1946, the Sawyer's
79. 220 Fed. 905 (7th Cir. 1914).
80. 114 U.S.P.Q. 154 (D. Ore. 1957).
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partnership incorporated as Sawyer's Inc. In 1949, a new agreement
between Western Photo, Sawyer's Inc., Gruber and Sawyer's partners
was excuted superseding all previous agreements and reciting the title
to the patent to be in Western Photo as trustee, and the beneficial
ownership to be one-half in Gruber and one-half in the Sawyer partners as individuals. The patent was licensed to Sawyer's Inc. in exchange for royalties which were, in turn, distributed to the beneficial
owners. In deciding the issue of whether or not the Sawyer partners
had received capital gains in return for the transfer of the one-half
interest in the patent from the Sawyer's partnership to Western Photo,
the Court held that the Sawyer partners individually never owned
the patent, that the transfer of the patent was made by the partnership
as an entity to Western Photo and that the individual partners had
only a right in the income and not in the patent itself. Therefore,
royalties received were taxed as ordinary income rather than capital
gains.
The Gruber case also illustrates various devices for jointly owning
a patent. The 1942 agreement created a co-ownership between an
individual and a partnership. By virtue of the 1946 agreement, a coownership was created between an individual and a corporation, each
owning a one-half undivided interest in the patent. The corporation
(Western Photo), in turn, licensed its interest to a partnership (Sawyer's) which was later incorporated. In the 1949 agreement, the coowners set up a trust in which Western Photo was trustee for the
beneficial owners, Gruber, the patentee (one-half interest) and the
Sawyer partners as individuals (one-half interest).
The case of Ful-Vue Sales Co. v. American Optical Co.81 illustrates
the application of the rule of nonaccountability between co-owners,
where the co-owners are partners in a joint venture. In this case one
partner of a joint venture sued the other partner for infringement of
a patent, the legal title of which was in the name of the plaintiff.
However, the court found after examining a complex fact situation
that there was an agreement between the plaintiff and defendant in
which the plaintiff was to purchase the patent in suit for the sole use
of the defendant and the plaintiff also had agreed to subsequently
assign the patent to the defendant. But the Court found that even if
the plaintiff's position that both plaintiff and defendant were to be
co-owners of the patent could be upheld, still there was no agreement
which required an accounting between the parties. Therefore, the
defendant, in any event, had the right to use the patent in suit without
accounting to the plaintiff and without infringing the patent.
The case of Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co.82 illustrates the rights
81. 118 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
82. 362 Mo. 1194, 247 S.W.2d 668 (1952).
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of co-owners upon dissolution of a corporation owning a patent jointly
assigned to the corporation by the only two share holders of the corporation. In 1941, Patent No. 2,266,206 for an "Adjustable Cantilever
Bracket" issued jointly to the plaintiff and Jackson as co-owners. They,
in turn, transferred their patent to a partnership and later incorporated the Jiffy Equipment Company, defendant, to which the partnership property, including the patent, was transferred. Plaintiff and
Jackson were the sole shareholders of the corporation. Jackson also
owned the Jackson Manufacturing Company, which obtained an exclusive sales and distribution agency for the patented articles from
the Jiffy Company. In 1948, Jackson died and his widow and administratrix, Frances Jackson, became the sole owner of the Jackson
Manufacturing Company and owner of a one-half interest in the Jiffy
Equipment Company. After about seven months of disputes over
business policies with Jackson's widow, the plaintiff petitioned for
dissolution of the corporation. The lower court held that all assets of
the corporation should be divided equally in kind between the plaintiff
and Jackson's widow, except the patent which should be assigned
to a trustee to be held for the equal use and benefit of the plaintiff
and the defendant administratrix. The lower court also held that because of the peculiar nature of the interests of co-owners in a United
States patent, an inequitable and unjust result would follow if an
undivided one-half interest were assigned outright to each former
shareholder, because the sole source of royalties from the Jackson
Manufacturing Company, previously shared equally between the
shareholders, had inured to the sole use and benefit of the administratrix by virtue of her rights as co-owner. The Missouri Supreme Court
reversed the order of the lower court setting up a trust to hold the
patent for the benefit of the co-owners, stating that:
[N]ot even a court of equity may take from either plaintiff or appellant
their statutory right to have the patent transferred to them "as coowners," and, ignoring that right, vest legal title to the patent in a trustee
with power to '"manage" or to effect a "sale" of the patent. Even if a
court of equity could under these circumstances (and we rule it cannot)
transfer the patent to a trustee, such trustee could not sell the patent.
For the trustee to sell the patent would thereby take from plaintiff and
from appellant their property without their consent under such circumstances as would amount to confiscation, and would violate due process.8 3
The court went on to say: "Equity cannot create a trust where the
parties did not intend to do so, and where none arose by operation of
law.,,84
In reviewing the equities of the parties, the court stated that it was
83. 247 S.W.2d at 675.
84. Id. at 676.
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the plaintiff himself who had petitioned for the dissolution and who
was responsible for his change in financial circumstances. The court
reminded the plaintiff that dissolution of the corporation terminated
the exclusive license agreement with the Jackson Manufacturing
Company and that each party was left free to make, use, sell or license
the patented invention in any way he saw fit. By way of comparison,
the court said that if one co-owner were capable of making a million
dollars from the use of his invention and the other co-owner was only
able to make a hundred dollars from the use of the invention, that
there was no principle of law or equity which authorized the courts
to compel the two co-owners to pool and equally divide their financial
returns.
Perhaps one of the most successful ways to avoid the consequences
of co-tenancy or joint ownership is to place the patent in trust for the
benefit of the owners. 85
In the case of Wescott v. Wayne Agricultural Works86 the patentee,
Moore, by means of a lengthy written agreement, assigned all his
right, title and interest in his patent to West and Wescott jointly with
full power to manage the patent for the benefit of West, Wescott and
Moore. Wescott received a beneficial one-half interest, whereas Moore
and West each received a beneficial one-fourth interest each. The
patentee entered into this agreement because of his indebtedness to
West and Wescott. Subsequently, Wescott assigned one-third of his
one-half interest to Kinsey and a like interest to Morris, so that each
would have a one-sixth interest in the patent. Kinsey, in turn, then
assigned one-half of his one-sixth interest, or a one-twelfth interest, to
Lawrence and the defendant. After the defendant began manufacturing and selling the seed drills covered by the patent, a bill was brought
by the trustees for an injunction and accounting. The court held that
the assignment by Moore to Wescott and West was a trust agreement
in which both West and Wescott were joint trustees, and that in order
to convey any title to the patent, there must be a joint deed by both
trustees. Therefore, the assignments by Wescott to Kinsey and
Morris conveyed no title to the patent and were void; Lawrence and
the defendant received nothing; and the defendant was liable for
infringement.
In a later case involving a trust and joint property rights in patents, 87 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that an assign-

ment by the trustee, who had no power to sell under the trust instrument, was void. In this case, the trustee was also a beneficiary under
85. McDuffee v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. Ry., 162 Fed. 36 (3rd Cir. 1908);
Wescott v. Wayne Agriculture Works 11 Fed. 298 (C.C.D. Ind. 1882); WALKER,
PATENTS

§ 364 (1937).

86. Supranote 67.
87. McDuffee v. Hestonville, M. & F. Pass. Ry. Co., 162 Fed. 36 (3d Cir. 1908).
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the trust along with two other beneficiaries, Williams and Schlesinger.
After the trustee had given the General Electric Company an option
to buy the patent, GE made an infringing device before the option
was exercised and sold the device to the defendant. The trustee as
plaintiff sued the defendant for infringement, as a result of which
General Electric intervened and demanded specific performance of
the option. The lower court held that the trustee could not be compelled to assign the entire right, title and interest in the patent, but
it did require the plaintiff as an individual to assign its one-third
beneficial interest to General Electric. Upon appeal, the circuit court
reversed the lower court's holding on the grounds that an assignment
of any portion of an interest in the patent would not only defeat the
terms of the trust agreement but would destroy the trust. The court
also noted that General Electric negotiated for the option with full
knowledge that it was negotiating with the trustee. In discussing joint
property rights under a trust, the court said:
It will therefore be seen that, to preserve their joint property and
prevent its practical destruction by co-owners, it is imperative that all
should be permitted to simply vest the legal title in one without imposing
any active duties on such holding trustee, and this shows that, while there
are no express duties for the trustee to perform, it by no means follows
the trust is a dry or inactive one. As holder of the legal title he can
bring suit, enjoin infringers from destroying the patent, and the mere
holding of the legal title in trust per se preserves the patent for the common good and prevents its destruction by each co-owner. We are of
opinion that these views have actuated patent practitioners in thus vesting the legal titles to patents in trustees.88
In another case 89 where co-owners assigned their patent to a corporation in which they were the sole stockholders, in exchange for
royalties, the defense of employment was pleaded by the corporation
in a suit brought by one of the original co-owners, Hook, to recover
royalties under the assignment. The position of the defendant corporation was that the invention embodied in the patent in suit was
made by the co-owners while they were employed by the corporation
and at the direction and by the use of the time, labor and materials
of the corporation, and consequently the patent actually belonged to
the corporation and not to its employees, Hook and Ackerman. The
court held that, although Hook and Ackerman were the employees
of the corporation, they were also the sole stockholders, and since
there were no other stockholders or outstanding creditors, they could
divide its assets between themselves as they pleased and impose a
payment for royalties upon the corporation.
88. Id. at 39.
89. Hook v. Hook &Ackerman, Inc.. 375 Pa. 278, 100 A.2d 374 (1953). See also
Milgram v. Jiffy Equipment Co., 362 Mo. 1194, 247 S.W.2d 668 (1952).
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On the other hand, in the recent case of Preis v. Eversharp0 where
the plaintiff, a former president of the defendant corporation and a coinventor with another employee of the corporation, sued the defendant
to recover for breach of his employment contract, the defendant
counterclaimed for the assignment of the plaintiff's interest in the
patent application filed by him and his co-inventor. The court here
held that by virtue of the plaintiff's employment by the defendant
the plaintiff's interest in the invention belonged to the defendant employer, and compelled an assignment consistent therewith. A similar
holding is found in the recent case of Aerial Products, Inc. v. Anzalone.91 Although joint inventorship was unquestioned in both cases,
title to the invention was to be in the employer because of the employment relationship.
In reviewing the above decisions on the law of joint ownership of
property, it is evident that the overwhelming weight of authority is
codified in the 1952 Patent Act,92 and that each co-owner of a patented
invention is free to utilize his interest in practically any way he wishes
without consent of and without accounting to any of the other owners.
The statute provides that this is the rule in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. Accordingly, to avoid the rule, such devices as
the contract, partnership, joint venture, corporation and trust have
been employed to control the joint ownership of a patent. However,
even some of these devices have failed where an innocent third party
or bona fide purchaser received an interest in the patent without notice
of the agreement. Also, the device has failed upon termination of the
arrangement, such as dissolution of partnership or corporation, where
no provision was made for the perpetuation of the rights of the joint
owners established by the agreements. It would therefore appear
advisable in protecting the rights of co-owners and avoiding the rule
of section 262 to select a device which is satisfactory to their needs and
to include provisions controlling the transfer of interests in the patent
with special emphasis on consent and accounting between the parties.
It is also advisable to provide for the respective rights of the owners
in the event of dissolution or termination of the agreement and to give
constructive notice to third parties by recording the instrument in
the Patent Office.
JOMNT PARTIES

Unless stipulated by agreement, the only other occasion which does
not permit joint owners from operating independently of each other
and from sharing in accordance with their respective interests, is
during litigation for infringement. In an infringement suit, the co90. 154 F. Supp. 98 (E.D.N.Y. 1957).

91. 6 Misc. 2d 349. 163 N.Y.S.2d 286 (Sup. Ct. 1957).

92. 35 U.S.C. § 262 (1952).
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owners of a patent must be joined as plaintiffs, and in a suit for declaratory judgment, the co-owners must be joined as parties defendant. 93 In the event that the plaintiff co-owners prevail in an infringement suit, each will share in the recovery in the proportionate amount
of his interest in the patent.94
One of the earlier leading cases on this subject is Gayler v. Wilder 95
involving a suit for infringement of a patent upon the use of plasterof-paris in the construction of a fire-proof chest known as the "Salamander Safe," issued to Fitzgerald in 1843. Fitzgerald assigned his
patent application to Enos Wilder who in turn assigned the same
application to the plaintiff, Benjamin Wilder. The patent issued to the
plaintiff as sole assignee. The plaintiff then entered into a lengthy
complicated agreement with Silas Herring granting Herring the exclusive right to make and vend the patented safe in the city, county
and state of New York and nowhere else. In the agreement the plaintiff
reserved to himself the right to manufacture in the city and state of
New York or elsewhere patented safes to sell outside the state and
city, but in the event the plaintiff sold any of the patented safes
within the state or city then he would pay Herring one cent a pound
for each of such safes. The plaintiff also could not establish any manufactory or works for making "Salamander Safes" within fifty miles
of New York City.
After holding that the conveyances of the patent application from
the patentee to Enos Wilder and from Enos Wilder to the plaintiff
were valid assignments of all the right, title and interest, not only
in the application, but also in the patent which issued upon the application, Chief Justice Taney further held that the conveyance from
the plaintiff to Herring was not an assignment but a license, because
Wilder reserved certain valuable rights in the patent for himself,
namely, the right to manufacture the patented devices within the
state of New York for sale outside the state. Consequently, the plaintiff, as the legal owner of the patent, had the sole right to bring the
suit for infringement. In reaching this decision, the Court reasoned:
By the fourteenth section [of the Act of 1836], the patentee may assign
his exclusive right within and throughout a specified part of the United
States, and upon such an assignment the assignee may sue in his own
name for an infringement of his rights. But in order to enable him to sue,
the assignment must undoubtedly convey to him the entire and unqualified
monopoly which the patentee held in the territory specified-excluding
the patentee himself, as well as others. And any assignment short of
this is a mere license. For it was obviously not the intention of the legis93. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS §§ 400-01 at 422, § 568 at 562-63 (3d ed.
1937); WALKER, PATENTS § 430 at 1637-38 (1937).
94. ELLIS, PATENT ASSIGNMENTS § 394 at 418, § 400 at 422 (3d ed. 1937).
95. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477 (1850).
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lature to permit several monopolies to be made out of one, and divided
among different persons within the same limits. Such a division would
inevitably lead to fraudulent impositions upon persons who desired to
purchase the use of the improvement, and would subject a party who,
under a mistake as to his rights, used the invention without authority,
to be harrassed by a multiplicity of suits instead of one. . . . But the
legal right in the monopoly remains in the patentee, and he alone can
maintain an action against a third party who commits an infringement
upon it.96
Forty years later, the United States Supreme Court speaking
through Mr. Justice Gray 97 further developed the law regarding the
rights of joint parties in infringement suits and the degree of ownership required, basing its decision upon Gayler v. Wilder. The Court
first had to decide the legal effect of five attempted transfers in a
patent for a fountain pen. The plaintiff-patentee assigned the entire
right, title and interest in the invention to his wife, Sarah E. Waterman, who, in turn licensed back to the plaintiff the exclusive right to
manufacture and sell the invention. Subsequently, Mrs. Waterman
assigned her interest in the patent to Asa L. Shipman's Sons as security
for a loan of $6,500. Upon repayment of the loan in full, the title in the
patent would revert to Mrs. Waterman. Asa L. Shipman's Sons then
assigned their entire interest in the patent to Asa L. Shipman. Subsequently, Mrs. Waterman assigned all her rights in the patent back
to her husband. The defendants in the infringement suit brought by
Waterman pleaded that the plaintiff at the time of filing the bill was
not possessed of the patent or of an exclusive right under it, and
therefore could not bring this infringement suit.
The opinion of the Court has become classic in Patent Law, and is
perhaps quoted more often than any other case regarding the various
degrees of ownership of a patent including the qualifying interests of
a party for bringing an infringement suit. The Court said:
The patentee or his assigns may, by instrument in writing, assign, grant
and convey, either, 1st, the whole patent, comprising the exclusive right
to make, use and vend the invention throughout the United States; or,
2d, an undivided part or share of that exclusive right; or, 3d, the exclusive
right under the patent within and throughout a specified part of the
United States. Rev. Stat. § 4898. A transfer of either of these three kinds
of interests is an assignment, properly speaking, and vests in the assignee
a title in so much of the patent itself, with a right to sue infringers;
in the second case, jointly with the assignor; in the first and third cases,
in the name of the assignee alone. Any assignment or transfer, short of
one of these, is a mere license, giving the licensee no title in the patent,
and no right to sue at law in his own name for an infringement. Rev.
Stat. § 4919; Gayler v. Wilder, 10 How. 477, 494, 495; Moore v. Marsh,
7 Wall. 515. In equity, as at law, when the transfer amounts to a license
96. Id. at 493.
97. Waterman v. MacKenzie, 138 U.S. 252 (1890).
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only, the title remains in the owner of the patent; and suit must be
brought in his name, and never in the name of the licensee alone, unless
that is necessary to prevent an absolute failure of justice, as where the
patentee is the infringer, and cannot sue himself. Any rights of the licensee
must be enforced through or in the name of the owner of the patent, and
perhaps, if necessary to protect the rights of all parties, joining the
licensee with him as a plaintiff....
Whether a transfer of a particular right or interest under a patent
is an assignment or a license does not depend upon the name by which
it calls itself, but upon the legal effect of its provisions. For instance, a
grant of an exclusive right to make, use and vend two patented machines
within a certain district is an assignment, and gives the grantee the right
to sue in his own name for an infringement within the district, because
the right, although limited to making, using and vending two machines,
excludes all other persons, even the patentee, from making, using or
vending like machines within the district. Wilson v. Rousseau, 4 How. 646,
686. On the other hand, the grant of an exclusive right under the patent
within a certain district, which does not include the right to make, and
the right to use, and the right to sell, is not a grant of a title in the whole
patent right within the district, and is therefore only a license. Such, for instance, is a grant of 'the full and exclusive right to make and vend' within
a certain district, reserving to the grantor the right to make within the district, to be sold outside of it. Gayler v. Wilder, above cited. So is a grant
of 'the exclusive right to make and use,' but not to sell, patented machines
within a certain district. Mitchell v. Hawley, 16 Wall. 544. So is an instrument granting 'the sole right and privilege of manufacturing and
selling' patented articles, and not expressly authorizing their use, because, though this might carry by implication the right to use articles
made under the patent by the licensee, it certainly would not authorize him
to use such articles made by others. 98

The Court then upheld a mortgage as a valid means of assigning a
patent.
The Court held that the first assignment of the plaintiff to his wife
was an absolute assignment of the entire patent-right. Because the
conveyance from Mrs. Waterman to her husband granted only the
exclusive rights to manufacture and sell, but not the right to use, the
Court held that this conveyance was a mere license. Therefore, Mrs.
Waterman's assignment of all her interests to Asa L. Shipman's Sons,
constituted an assignment by way of a mortgage, and the subsequent

assignment by Asa L. Shipman's Sons to Asa L. Shipman, individual,
made the latter the sole legal owner of the patent. Mrs. Waterman's

subsequent assignment to her husband was void because she had nothing left to convey. Thus, Shipman as the mortgagee and sole owner
of the patent was the only person entitled to maintain a suit for infringement, and the dismissal of the suit by the lower court was up-

held.
98. Id. at 255-56.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 11

In the next major development of the law regarding joint parties in
a patent infringement suit, Judge Clark of the Circuit Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee, in the case of Van Orden v. Nashville,9
held that a part owner of a patent cannot sue alone, but must join all
the co-owners in order that only one suit be maintained for the same
infringement. The Court also held that a joint owner of a patent cannot sue his co-owners as defendants, instead of joining them as plaintiffs. There were actually two suits before the court. The first case was
brought by Van Orden as the assignee of an undivided one-fourth
interest in a patent, against the City of Nashville for the infringement
of an improvement in a feed-water heater for steam fire engines. Van
Orden also joined the patentee, Brickill, who owned another onefourth share of the patent, as a defendant, and other defendants who
owned the remaining one-half interest in the patent, because they
declined to join as plaintiffs. In the second case, the patentee, Brickill,
and those parties owning the remaining one-half interest in the patent
joined in a like suit against the City and against Van Orden as the
defendant, because he declined to join with the others as plaintiff.
The court quoted profusely from the decisions in Gayler v. Wilder,
and Waterman v. Mackenzie.
However, in the case of Lalance & Grosjean Manufacturing Company v. Haberman Mfg. Co. 00° it was held that once the co-owners
of a patent have joined as plaintiffs in an infringement suit, the right
of one co-owner to recover his damages from the defendant cannot be
defeated by the execution of an assignment and a release by the other
co-owner.
Another major development in the rights of joint parties to an infringement suit was rendered in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft in
1926 in the case of Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp.
of America.'0 ' This was a suit for infringement of patents of Lee
DeForest for devices for amplifying feeble electric currents and certain new and useful improvements in space telegraphy, brought by
the plaintiff, RCA, who had obtained the exclusive license in the
patent through a series of agreements involving General Electric,
American Telephone and Western Electric, the rights in the agreement
originating with the DeForest Company, the assignee of the patentee.
The plaintiff, RCA, as the exclusive licensee of the patent, joined the
DeForest Company, the record owner of the patents, as a co-plaintiff
without the consent of the DeForest Company. The defendant, Independent Wireless Company, moved to dismiss the action on the
grounds of improper joinder of parties. The District Court for the
99. 67 Fed. 331 (C.C.M.D. Tenn. 1895).
100. 93 Fed. 197, 198 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1899).
101. 269 U.S. 459 (1926).
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Southern District of New York sustained the motion and dismissed
the bill, 0 2 but was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. 10 3 The Supreme Court held that there was no question but
that a suit must be brought in the name of the patent owner. However,
it went on to say:
It seems clear then on principle and authority that the owner of a
patent who grants to another the exclusive right to make, use or vend
the invention, which does not constitute a statutory assignment, holds
the title to the patent in trust for such a licensee, to the extent that he
must allow the use of his name as plaintiff in any action brought at the
instance of the licensee in law or in equity to obtain damages for the
injury to his exclusive right by an infringer or to enjoin infringement
of it.104

The Court further held that this rule would apply whether or not the
owner gave his consent or whether or not the owner was within the
jurisdiction of the Court, since "Equity will not suffer a wrong without
a remedy."
In the suit of Rainbow Rubber Co. v. Holtite Mfg. Co. 0 5 the court
sustained the defendant's motion to dismiss the suit for patent infringement because Rainbow Rubber Company was a joint owner of
a one-half interest in the patent and joined its co-owner, Auburn
Rubber Corp. without the consent of Auburn. After hearing plaintiff's
argument for a trust relationship between the co-owners, the Court
held that the reasoning of the Independent Wireless case did not apply in the case of co-owners, stating: "Obviously no trust relationship
exists between the two co-owners of the patent in the present suit.
Each has a separate, independent right which he may lawfully exercise. He is under no obligation to allow his name to be used in any
suit." 0 6 The court also held that if it was true, as alleged, that the
Auburn Rubber Corp. had granted a license to the defendant, then this
was something it had a perfect right to do without the consent of its
07
co-owner, the Rainbow Rubber Co.1
In dismissing the possible inequities of the situation, the court went
on to say, "[T]he actual plaintiff has done this to itself by reason of its
own voluntary action, to wit, its election to assume the status of a part
owner merely of a patent, with the limitations and restrictions inherent in the law incident to such status."' 08 The plaintiff's situation was
compared with that of a tenant by the entirety of real property or a
joint owner of a bank account who assume their status on a voluntary
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

297 Fed. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
297 Fed. 521 (2d Cir. 1924).
269 U.S. at 469.
20 F. Supp. 913 (D. Md. 1937).
Id. at 915.
Ibid.
Id. at 916.
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basis and often find themselves faced with the inability to get their
co-tenant or co-depositer to join with them in asserting their rights.
On the other hand, the court upheld the defendant's position of not
being subjected to a multiplicity of infringement suits by various coowners.109
The situation of a co-owner attempting to bring an infringement
suit without the consent of his other co-owner also arose in the case of
Gibbs v. Emerson Elec. Co.110 In this case plaintiff, the patentee, had
assigned a one-half interest to Berkowitz, who refused to join in the
infringement suit brought by the plaintiff and was therefore named
a defendant in accordance with rule 19 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.'
The Court refused to apply Rule 19 (a) to this
situation in the following language: "From an examination of the
authorities it appears that one joint owner or co-owner or tenant in
common of a patent right cannot compel the other co-owner to join
in a suit for an infringement, and neither can he make him a party
defendant. This being the law, the plaintiff is not entitled to maintain
this suit. It has been held that these are substantive rights and they
12
cannot be controlled by adjective or procedural law.'
In a situation quite similar to the facts of the Gibbs case, the Hurd
case113 again raised the issue as to whether or not a joint owner could
maintain a suit for infringement without joining his co-owner as a
plaintiff, in view of rule 19 (a). However, since the plaintiff made no
motion to join his co-owner either as a defendant or as involuntary
plaintiff, rule 19 (a) was not in issue, and the court following the
recognized law affirmed the dismissal of the action because all the coowners of the patent were not joined as plaintiffs.
The situation of the parties plaintiff was reversed from the situation
in the Independent Wireless case, in the case of Dental Precision
Shoulder, Inc. v. L. D. Caulk Company, Inc." 4 Here, the plaintiff, who
was the owner of the patent in suit, moved to add as an involuntary
plaintiff the Consolidated Diamond Saw Blade Corporation as an exclusive licensee, alleging that the Saw Blade Company had declined to
join. The court declined to rule on the applicability of the Independent
109. Id. at 917.
110. 29 F. Supp. 810 (W.D. Mo. 1939).
111. "Rule 19. Necessary Joinder of Parties:
"(a) Necessary Joinder. Subject to the provisions of Rule 23 and of
subdivision (b) of this rule, persons having a joint interest shall be
made parties and be joined on the same side as plaintiffs or defendants.
When a person who should join as a plaintiff refuses to do so, he may
be made a defendant, or, in proper cases, an involuntary plaintiff."
FED. R. Civ. P. 19. See also BENDER, FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL 171, 173,

177-78 (1952).

112. 29 F. Supp. at 812.

113. Hurd v. Sheffield Steel Corp., 181 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1950).
114. 7 F.R.D. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
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Wireless case because the party proposed to-be joined was within the
process of the court, which granted the motion with the understanding
that the Saw Blade Company would have the opportunity of raising
the jurisdictional question if it desired.
In another case, Hook v. Hook & Ackerman, Inc.,115 the defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint for declaratory judgment on the
grounds that one of the co-plaintiffs Hook had not joined the other
co-owner, Ackerman, both of whom had formerly transferred their
interest in the patent to the defendant in a written instrument designated an "exclusive license." The court, following Waterman v.
MacKenzie, found that even though the instrument was called an
"exclusive license," the legal effect of the instrument was an assignment to the defendant corporation and that the defendant was the
sole owner of the patent. Thus, both Hook and Ackerman had divested
themselves of all interests in the patent and Ackerman was not an
indispensable party to the suit. The court further held that the doctrine of the Independent Wireless case was not in conflict with the
conclusions of the court. The court found that the instrument conveyed
exclusive rights to make, use and sell the invention and to license
others to do so, and that no rights were reserved in the former coowners, such as the right to use which was withheld in the case of
Waterman v. MacKenzie. Furthermore, the court held that reservation
of royalties and forfeiture clauses for non-performance did not reduce
the effect of the conveyance as an assignment.
The cases of Waterman v. MacKenzie, and Independent Wireless
were also relied upon in the case of Holliday v. Long Mfg. Co.116 where
the defendant moved to dismiss the suit for infringement on the
grounds that the exclusive licensee, Harrington Company, was not
joined as an indispensable party, in accordance with a written agreement between the plaintiff-owner and the exclusive licensee. The court
denied the motion because it found that the written instrument between the plaintiff and the Harrington Company granted the exclusive
right to manufacture and sell, but not the right to use, the patented
invention and therefore found that the conveyance was a license and
not an assignment in accordance with the ruling of Waterman v. MacKenzie. The court found that although the exclusive licensee was not
an indispensable party, it was a proper party and could intervene in
the action in order to protect its rights.
The courts have found little difficulty in upholding the doctrine that
non-exclusive licensees are not indispensable parties to a patent in117
fringement suit."
In addition to finding that the plaintiff was a non115. 187 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1951).

116. 18 F.R.D. 45 (E.D.N.C. 1955).
117. Switzer Bros., Inc. v. Byrne, 242 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1957); Philadelphia
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exclusive licensee in the case of PhiladelphiaBrief Case Co. v. Specialty Products Co.1lB the court also found that the plaintiff's motive
in instituting the suit was to obtain a decree holding the patent under
which it was licensed to be invalid, in order to relieve the plaintiff
of any further liability for royalty payments under the license, and
therefore the plaintiff could be estopped from bringing the action.
In the case of Switzer Bros. Inc. v. Byrnen1 9 it was found that the
plaintiff was not only a nonexclusive licensee but also that this condition could not be cured after the institution of the suit by an assignment of the patent from all the co-owners to the nonexclusive licensee.
Aii interesting departure from the above rule regarding a nonexclusive licensee was promulgated by Judge Learned Hand in the case
of A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson,120 a suit for declaratory judgment
by one whose customers were threatened with infringement suits by
the defendant. The patent in suit was for ships' hatch covers issued
to Harry Cocks, a British subject, who assigned the patent to a British
corporation, which in turn licensed the defendant, Dickson, to manufacture and sell the patented devices within the United States for a
term of ten years and under several other restrictions which qualified
the defendant as, at most, a nonexclusive licensee. Another requirement which the licensor imposed upon the licensee was not to do or
permit anything to be done which would in any way prejudice the
rights of the licensor. Judge Hand found the defendant could not have
sued upon the Cocks patent in his own name because he was a mere
licensee under the doctrine of Waterman v. MacKenzie, and that ordinarily speaking a judgment against the defendant would not prevent
the licensor from thereafter suing plaintiff's customers.
Nevertheless, every patent owner has an interest in keeping the reputation of his patent from the stain of a judgment of invalidity-an interest
which it is proper for a court to recognize. In the case at bar the Cocks
company can avoid that prejudice by intervening in this action; and
indeed it must be given the opportunity to do so ....
Yet, even though
the Cocks company had done nothing more than license Dickson, the
scales, so balanced, would tip to the plaintiff's side; for it would be
obviously unfair to leave its business exposed to continuous indirect
attack, merely to preserve the company's choice of forum ....
But the
case is stronger for the plaintiff than that, for the Cocks company went
further than merely to license Dickson; it not only exacted a promise
from him not to 'permit' its interests to be 'prejudiced,' but it has now
authorized him to issue such licenses under its patent. It has plainly
Brief Case Co. v. Specialty Products Co., 145 F. Supp. 425 (D.N.J. 1956);
Photometric Products Corp. v. Radtke, 17 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Zenith
Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F.Supp. 803 (D. Del. 1954).
118. Supra note 117.
119. 242 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1957).
120. 141 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1944), reversing 52 F. Supp. 566 (D. Conn. 1943).
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used him to enforce its patent, and if it has not surrendered its choice
of a forum, at least its interest in that choice has dwindled too much to
stand against the plaintiff's.121
Consequently, the decision of the lower court insofar as it denied the
prayer for a declaratory judgment was reversed. Judge Hand's ap1
proach is distinguished in the case of Bendix Aviation Corp. v. Kury, 22
as follows: "If it could be shown that the legal relationship resulting
from co-ownership of a patent involved something resembling agency
on the part of one co-owner toward another, perhaps it would be
proper to apply here the teachings of that decision (A. L. Smith Iron
Company v. Dickson); however, the cases examined and referred to
above, seem necessarily to point to an opposite conclusion." It was
also held that if the absent defendant co-licensor was an indispensable
party in an infringement action, then he would be nonetheless so in
a declaratory judgment suit in which the issue of infringement is to be
tried.
In the case of Aberdeen Hosiery Mills v. Kaufman,2 3 the court followed the ruling in A. L. Smith Iron Co. v. Dickson, holding that the
three co-owners of the patent named as defendants in a suit for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity and noninfringement, were
engaged in a joint venture in which the defendant Kayser, who was
properly before the court, was the agent of Standard, the absent coowner, and consequently defendant's motion to dismiss for 'failure to
join an indispensable party was denied. It was also found that the
parties had created this situation for the very purpose of defeating
any possible lawsuits against them for declaratory judgment.
In the case of Hartley Pen Co. v. Lindy Pen Co.1 4 a third party,
Kimberly Corporation, attempted to intervene in the suit as the equitable owner of the patent on the grounds that the patentees were
employed by Kimberly at the time of the invention. The court held
that although this was a claim which it could properly consider, the
claim of the intervener was barred by the statute of limitations.
A different rule from that applied to infringement suits controls
the joinder of parties in an interference suit for determining the issue
of priority of invention between applicants for a patent. These issues
have arisen primarily in the federal courts outside the District of
Columbia under the old provisions for interference proceedings under
section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, or since January 1, 1953 under
section 146 of title 35 of the United States Code. Interference proceedings originate in the Patent Office between two or more applicants for
121.
122.
123.
124.

141 F.2d at 6.
88 F. Supp. 243 (E.D. N.Y. 1950).
113 F. Supp. 833 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
16 F.R.D. 141 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
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a patent or an applicant and a patentee, 25 at a hearing before the
Board of Patent Interferences. Any party dissatisfied with the decision
of the Board may, instead of appealing to the U. S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, have remedy by civil action, which must be commenced within a specified time. 2 6 The statute provides, "If there be
adverse parties residing in a plurality of districts not embraced within
the same state, or an adverse party residing in a foreign country, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia shall have
jurisdiction and may issue summons against the adverse parties directed to the marshal of any district in which any adverse party
27
resides.'
With this background, several cases originating in federal district
courts outside the District of Columbia under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes may now be considered. In the case of Parker RustProof Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.1 28 the defendant alleged
that the plaintiff omitted to join one of the joint applicants of the
patent application under which the defendant was assignee, and that
by reason of certain unrecorded documents, this joint applicant Curtin
was an indispensable party. The Second Circuit Court agreed with the
lower court that, ordinarily, Curtin should be joined, because although
he and Cline, his co-inventor, assigned their interests to the defendant,
Western Union, the unrecorded instruments disclosed that the defendant granted back to Curtin certain exclusive rights and control in the
application which would make him an indispensable party. However,
it was shown that both the defendant and Curtin had knowledge of
the suit and the unrecorded instruments and purposely delayed the
suit until the statutory time limitation for filing suit in the District
of Columbia had elapsed. Thus, because of the defendant's and Curtin's
inequitable conduct, the lower court's dismissal of the bill was reversed, with directions to permit Curtin to intervene as a party defendant, if he desired. Although in this case, the plaintiff-appellant
urged that Curtin's position as a licensee would not require him to
be made a party in an infringement suit, the court held that "because
of the difference in the language of R.S. Sec. 4919, 35 U.S.C.A. Sec. 67,
we cannot regard infringement suits as controlling.' 1 29
Under a similar set of facts to the Parker Rust-Proof Co. case, the
Third Circuit in United States v. Washington Institute of Technology,
Inc.130 dismissed an action under section 4915 of the Revised Statutes,
brought by the United States as assignee of a patent application, be125. 35 U.S.C. § 135 (1952).
126. PAT. OFF. R.P. 303-04 (Sept. 1955).
127. 35 U.S.C. § 146 (1952).

128. 105 F.2d 976 (2d Cir. 1939).
129. Id. at 979.
130. 138 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1943).
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cause the defendant's assignor was an indispensable party and was not
joined. The assignor was held to be indispensable because he did not
actually part with all his interests in the patent application, but retained certain rights which gave him control over its manufacture and
use. The court held that the assignor had a sufficient joint interest
to make him an indispensable party under rule 19 (a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In this case, again it was too late for the
plaintiff to refile his suit in the District of Columbia.
In the case of Paper Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co.., 31 before
the District Court of Delaware, a complaint under section 4915 of the
Revised Statutes was dismissed because the plaintiff had failed to
join as mortgagee, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).
The court held that the principles determining the parties necessary
to a patent infringement suit could also be considered in the determination of the right to that patent; consequently, the case of Waterman v. MacKenzie, although relating to a patent infringement suit,
stated the law which was controlling in this case, that a mortgagee of a
patent was the sole indispensable party. Therefore, the real party in
interest was the RFC, and the only one entitled to maintain this action.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit the
decision of the district court in the Paper Container case was reversed.132 In the first place, the court of appeals found that the agreement between the plaintiff and the RFC amounted to an exclusive
license, whereas the District Court had found that the rights reserved
to the plaintiff amounted to a "personal, nonexclusive and non-assignable royalty-free right and license." The court of appeals also found
that the agreement between the plaintiff (Paper Container) and RFC
was that Paper Container alone and in its own name should prosecute
the patent application to a final conclusion. The court of appeals further
found that the qualifications in the assignment were sufficient to
constitute both the plaintiff and RFC as real parties in interest and
therefore indispensable parties. It was also determined from the language of section 4915 of the Revised Statutes, "whenever any applicant
is dissatisfied with the decision of the board of interference examiners,
the applicant. .. may have remedy by bill in equity. . .. '13 that the
plaintiff qualified as "any applicant" under the statute and could therefore bring suit in its own name. It seems that the court of appeals went
quite far in applying the principle of the Independent Wireless case
and holding that the plaintiff and RFC were in legal effect trustees
for each other. The plaintiff was in a realistic sense the applicant and
RFC's title was merely for security. The court did require that RFC
131. 74 F. Supp. 389 (D. Del. 1947).
132. Paper Container Mfg. Co. v. Dixie Cup Co., 170 F.2d 333 (3d Cir. 1948).
133. Id. at 337.
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be joined as an indispensable party and found that the plaintiff had
filed a motion for joinder and that RFC had consented to be joined.
"In conclusion we should point out that it makes no legal difference
to Dixie Cup whether Paper Container or RFC is the real and therefore indispensable party in interest or whether both are real and
''134
indispensable parties.
In a 1956 decision, Turchan v. Bailey Meter Co.,135 the same district
judge who rendered the decision in the Paper Container case, denied a
motion to dismiss the complaint under section 146 of title 35 of the
Code on the grounds that a recalcitrant joint applicant was not an indispensable party. He followed the decision of the Third Circuit in
the Paper Container case, and held that "the reasoning of cases which
required joint patent owners to join in cases of infringement has no
application to cases like the present."'136 The decision was also based
upon section 116 of title 35 which provides for the protection of the
rights of one inventor where a recalcitrant co-inventor refuses to join
37
in the application or cannot be found.
Although the courts in the above cases arising out of interference
proceedings, appear to be consistent in holding that rules regarding
joinder of parties in interference cases are different from principles
governing joinder of parties in infringement cases, they appear to be
inconsistent in their treatment of the parties. In the ParkerRust-Proof
Co. case and the United States v. Washington Institute case, the courts
held that parties whose interests amounted to that of a licensee were
indispensable parties, but in the case of Turchan v. Bailey Meter Co.,
the court held that a joint applicant for a patent was not an indispensable party. Yet upon fruition of an application into a patent a joint
applicant or his assignee attains the full status of a co-owner of a
patent.
It would appear from the above cases that the primary reason for
joinder of co-owners in an infringement action is to prevent a multiplicity of suits. Therefore, mere licensees having no standing to bring
suit for infringement, unless a trust or agency relationship can be
established, are not indispensable parties. On the other hand a mere
licensee has a very real interest in a patent application being litigated
under section 146 of title 35 to determine priority of invention, and
the licensee's interest will become more valuable if priority is awarded
to his application upon which a patent will issue.
134. Id. at 339.
135. 19 F.R.D. 201 (D. Del. 1956).
136. Id. at 205.
137. "If a joint inventor refuses to join in an application for patent or cannot be found or reached after diligent effort, the application may be made by
the other inventor on behalf of himself and the omitted inventor. The Commissioner, on proof of the pertinent facts and after such notice to the omitted
inventor as he prescribes, may grant a patent to the inventor making the
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Another interesting case involving joint plaintiffs who were joint
applicants for a patent on a demolition torpedo is Strategical Demolition Torpedo Co. v. United States. 138 The plaintiffs sued the Navy
Department for infringement of their patent, but the Government
pleaded that since one of the four applicants was an employee of the
Government at the time the invention was made, then this suit must
be dismissed in view of section 1498 of the Judicial Code (Title 28),
which states that the right to sue "shall not apply to any device discovered or invented by an employee during the time of such employment or service." Judge Madden, speaking for the majority, held the
device was invented by a government employee and three other men,
and therefore it was within the statutory exception "invented by an
employee." He dismissed the plaintiff's contention that the contribution of each inventor should be individually evaluated and the statute
applied only against the contribution by the government employee,
and upheld the indivisibility of a patent.
In a well reasoned dissent, Chief Judge Jones said: "The fact that
four people own a patent that is indivisible does not keep four people
from each owning a one-fourth interest any more than the fact that
one of four people, in joint ownership, was an alien and prohibited
by State law from owning property, would forfeit the rights or interests of the other three and cause the entire property to escheat to the
State."139

Judge Jones further reasoned that it was common knowledge that
more skilled tools and ideas were obtained in outside industry than
were ever developed in a Government shop and it was just as possible
for the one applicant who was a government employee to have gleaned
as much or more information from outside industry than from the
government. The chief judge also pointed out the danger under the
majority rule to the patent rights of private industry employing
former government employees. 140
application, subject to the same rights which the omitted inventor would have
had if he had been joined. The omitted inventor may subsequently join in
the application." 35 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).

138. 119 Ct. Cl. 29.1, 96 F. Supp. 315 (1951).

139. 96 F. Supp. at 317.
140. Id. at 318. See 20 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 244-46 (1951) for a criticism of
this case.

